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a b s t r a c t
In component-based development, software components are taken as units of composition.
Nevertheless, to achieve the widely disseminated status of components being plugged
together as simple ‘Lego Pieces’, the integration of components must be carefully designed,
systematised and verified; only this can ensure reliable architectures. In this work, we
propose some conformance notions to predict the precise nature of some forms of
composition, considering coordination patterns used in the integration. These notions are
formalised in terms of the denotational semantics of the process algebra CSP, and assist the
designer in common activities during integration, such as the substitution of component
specifications by implementations, contract adaptations, and system extensions. To
support mechanical verifications using FDR (a model-checker for CSP), we derive test
characterisations from the denotational definitions of conformance. We illustrate the
application of these notions through a systematic composition strategy of software
frameworks, and we mechanically verify the preservation of behavioural component
properties in these compositions. Moreover, we characterise the well-formedness of a
coordination pattern used in this strategy at the design stage, before components are
assembled.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Although component-based software development [1] has been around for a long time [2], over the last decade it has
re-emerged as a promising paradigm to deal with the ever increasing need for mastering complexity, evolution and reuse
in the design of computer based systems. The basic motivation for this paradigm is to replace conventional programming
with the composition and configuration of reusable and independent units, called components.
In practice, however, concurrent, distributed and heterogeneous software components do not fit together like ‘Lego
Pieces’, or just using a simple glue code. Critical issues for software construction are related to the design of the
communication-based interaction mechanisms that permit components to work together [3]; for instance, some simple
mechanisms have services that convert data or facilitate the interaction among components. The correct design of these
elements is critical because otherwise the systemmaymalfunction in subtleways ormaynotwork at all. This concern is even
more acutewhen connectors are put together to coordinate a group of components to accomplish a collective set of tasks [4].
Particular problems arise when coordinating the integration of heterogeneous and concurrent software components [5,6].
Integration solutions are often developed in an ad hocmanner, inwhich incompatibilities are not discovered until their side-
effects emerge during implementation [5]; some common problems are differences in the component design concerning
communication styles, data representation, protocols, synchronisation models, etc.
Therefore, it is crucial to verify whether Component Based Systems (CBS) satisfy some desired properties. Instead
of verifying the entire system, after all components have been assembled, a more promising direction is to conceive a
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constructive approach that defines properties to be preserved by individual components aswell as for patterns of component
composition. Such an approach would offer support for reasoning about the composition of components, to guide the
composition in order to meet the specification of a larger system, and to predict the precise nature of any composite, so
that the composite can in turn be used as a unit for further composition. The predictability of component composition
depends on the nature of the component properties intended to be preserved in the composition [7]. Behavioural properties
are related to the architecture (the way components are disposed) and to the environment in which the system is used. A
constructive approach tends to generate more manageable proof obligations of the component and composition elements
(like coordinators) in isolation, predicting emergent properties [8] that depend on the interaction of all components within
the system.
Most approaches to composition [9,10] concentrate only on systematising the integration or reuse of components, lacking
either formality or considering complex mismatches in the behaviours of components in the composition; they usually
neither define conformance notions for components in isolation, nor for compositions. On the other hand, solid efforts to
define conformance notions [11,12] do not provide test characterisations that can bemechanically performed in verification
tools.
This article is a significant extension of [13], which considers some conformance notions for composing frameworks.
Here, we formalise a component model for interaction components. The constructive constraints for this model are based
on the notions of substitutability and compatibility of software components. These notions allow checking whether a given
component can successfully replace another in a particular application, and whether the behaviours of two components
are compatible for them to interoperate, respectively. These basic notions support conformance notions for component
composition. The systematic strategy for composition addressed in [13] is revisitedhere as a particular case study to illustrate
the conformance notions.
The entire approach is based on the CSP process algebra [14], which allows us to formally address property
characterisation and preservation. Every conformance notion is defined in terms of the CSP denotational semantics,
which is followed by a testing characterisation based on the failures model of CSP and process refinement notions.
This allows automated verification using the FDR tool [15], a model checker for CSP. Our component model focuses
on software components whose contracts are described by their dynamic behaviour, interfaces, and protocols, and that
repeatedly present the same behaviour to the environment. This covers a wide range of modern applications, such as
Session Enterprise JavaBeansTM and transactional conversational services. We analyse the behavioural conformance of
components in compositions, implementations and substitutions of interaction components, some of the main activities
in Component-Based Development [1]. As far as we are aware [16–18,11,3,12], no previous work has formally addressed
similar conformance notions, nor provided such a test characterisation for analysing coordination patterns in the integration
(or composition) of components, as we do.
In Section 2wepresent amotivating example and raise important demands that guide us throughout subsequent sections
of this paper. The next section gives an introduction to CSP based on our working example, and formally defines software
components. Section 4 presents some conformance notions for software components in isolation. Based on the basic notions
for components, Section 5 introduces conformance notions for composition. Section 5 also presents an elaborate integration
pattern for software components, which is used in our strategy for framework composition presented in Section 6. The
application of notions for composition conformance is presented in Section 7, which is illustrated by a client/server case
study. Related work is considered in Section 8, and a summary of our results as well as topics for further research are
presented in Section 9.
2. Motivating example: Coordination patterns
As motivation, some component integration patterns [19,20] are presented in this section. Patterns express common
solutions to recurring problems. More abstract patterns, such as the architectural ones we present here, are implemented
in terms of more basic design patterns [21,22]. The patterns differ in the way they deal with specific characteristics of the
domain problem, which in our case are integration concerns [5,6]. While we present these patterns for coordination, we
raise some questions about the preservation of their desired properties during the system evolution.
Fig. 1 presents two abstract patterns using the workflow notation [23]. As in [24], we use this notation because
coordination is about managing dependencies among activities, and workflow is one of the most well known abstract
notations to represent them. This is also evident in the workflows describing standards of orchestration of service-oriented
systems (as, for instance, WS-BPEL) [25].
The pattern in Fig. 1.a represents an abstract solution for managing shared resources, one of the most common
coordination problems [5,24].Whenevermultiple activities (A and B in the figure) share some limited resource (for example,
storage space, or server time), a coordinator that controls the access to the resource is needed. The coordination processmust
serialise the incoming concurrent requests, and select the request to be served, by using a pre-defined access policy, such as
first-come/first-serve. In the abstract pattern in Fig. 1.a one of the branches (A or B) is chosen by the deferred choice c , based
on interaction with the operating environment. There is no explicit choice, but rather a race between different branches.
Desired properties of such a pattern are that all clients will eventually obtain the resource (fairness), or, depending on the
nature of the resource, that interactions of one client will not interfere with interactions of another.
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Fig. 1. Enterprise patterns: (a) resource manager (b) translator.
Fig. 2. Composed framework.
The pattern in Fig. 1.b represents an abstract translator. Whenever one activity produces some information that is used
by another activity, a coordinator that controls the transfer and mapping of information between activities is needed.
It continuously receives a sequence of input data (rcv ev) from the producer, and sends the respective sequence of data
(snd ev′) to a consumer component. The exclusive choices specify an internal mechanism that selects the following task
depending on the outcome of a preceding task. In other words, these choices decide how long the coordinator will wait for
the sequence of inputs, or how many events are output as a result. The coordinator must guarantee the physical transfer
of information between the entities, control their synchronisation, and eventually control the replication of information in
case of a replicated transfer (multicast or broadcast). Particular situations inwhich this abstract pattern occurs in distributed
systems are the integration of heterogeneous components and the reduction of the number of direct service calls of a remote
node (the pattern data transfer object [19]). Similar patterns are also used to adapt/reuse legacy or third-party components
during system evolution.
These patterns can be used, for instance, to compose twoheterogeneous components (or frameworks) CLIENT and SERVER
(see Fig. 2). In the example, SERVER might already be interacting with other applications (generically represented by the
environment). The purpose is to introduce the CLIENT component as a new client of SERVER. The problem, however, is
twofold. Firstly, in general, CLIENT and SERVER are heterogeneous components that use different services and data types
in their communication. Secondly, we assume that SERVER is currently at its maximum capacity of clients (which are
currently part of the system environment); in other words, the contract of SERVER does not give any guarantee about
extra communications (the new communication with CLIENT , in the example). Furthermore, it is necessary to translate
this communication, coordinate the sharing of SERVER between its different clients (the CLIENT component and the
environment), and guarantee the preservation of important properties of this composition. For instance, it is essential to
ensure that the environment will not see any difference in its communication with SERVER after the composition.
A possible solution for coordinating the integration of CLIENT and SERVER is to compose the resource manager and the
translator patterns in Fig. 1. The new coordination pattern would be formed of a resource manager (see Fig. 1.a) whose
activity A is a translator (following the pattern behaviour described in Fig. 1.b). More details of this pattern are given in
Section 5. All these patterns are useful to specify the design of abstract patterns of services to serve coordination needs of
unspecified components. They become more concrete only later in the life-cycle, on the assembly with the components
(CLIENT and SERVER in our example), by relying on the component interfaces and contracts [26]. As a consequence of
coordinator life-time, some immediate questions to ask about a coordinator are:
• How to preserve the coordination purpose (abstraction) in the concrete pattern solution?
• Which properties emerge from the domain analysis during the coordination design?
Overall, aswell as other authors [18,11,27], we have identified the need to evaluate towhat extent a final implementation
satisfies the initial coordination purpose. In order to accomplish this, we introduce conformance notions that allow us to
guarantee these properties both at the coordination design level and in its final implementation. The questions raised in this
section are addressed during the paper, using the formal models of the workflows illustrated here.
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3. Components in CSP
The basic concepts in Component-Based Software Engineering (CBSE) originate from different areas of software
engineering and computer science, such as object-oriented programming, reuse, software architecture, and formal
specification [28]. A consequence of this situation, together with distinct efforts of the industry related to component
technology, is that CBSE uses concepts that are still not fully formalised [29]. For instance, the terms component, interface
and contract, although widely discussed, have no consensual meaning. The meaning of these concepts subtly differs in the
way components are observed during development. In this work, we focus on component-driven architectures, which have
beenwidely promoted by Architectural Description Languages (ADLs) [30], and have influenced several changes in the OMG
Unified Modelling Language (UML) [31].
We formalise several concepts in CBSE: interfaces, dynamic behaviour, component contracts, and communication protocols.
We focus on the interaction points (represented here by interfaces) of black box components and their runtime behaviour.
We are not concerned with how components are implemented. The component external behaviour is represented by a CSP
process, denoted by a component contract. Actually, we use the CSP process algebra [14] to formalise our entire approach.
CSP allows the description of system components in terms of synchronous processes that operate independently, and
interact with each other through message-passing communication. The relationship between processes is described using
process algebraic operators from which elaborate concurrency and distributed patterns can be constructed. Moreover, CSP
offers rich semanticmodels that support awide range of process verifications, and comparisons. The operators and semantic
models of CSP are explained as the need arises.
3.1. Component interfaces
In general, components are described by means of interfaces, which define their services and capabilities independently
from any particular implementation. Interfaces typically present this information in terms of the signature of services
provided or required by the component. We assume that interfaces simply consist of input and output events, which may
express pairs of request-response or individual synchronisation events of a service. For the following definition of interfaces,
only the CSP concept of alphabet (the set of all events used by a process) is required. We use Σ for the set of all possible
events in the system. Given a process P , the expression αP gives its alphabet.
Definition 1 (Interface). An interface I is a pair of input and output events with signature (PΣ, PΣ), where
1. Syntactically, I.inputs = first(I) and I.outputs = second(I), where first and second yield the first and the second element
of a pair, respectively;
2. inputs and outputs are disjoint, I.inputs ∩ I.outputs = ∅;
3. The complete alphabet of I is αI = I.inputs ∪ I.outputs.
At this level of abstraction, an input and an output event can be interpreted as representing, for instance, a method
invocation of a component in the object-oriented paradigm.
To help intuition, consider the communication between the CLIENT and the SERVER components (see Fig. 2). These
components encapsulate services of two frameworks in a way that SERVERmight provide services required by CLIENT . The
interfaces of these components are the places where frameworks are customised (hot spots) by fulfilling their required
services and, furthermore, the interfaces specify the points of composition. For instance, HSCL and HSSV represent a required
and a provided interface of CLIENT and SERVER, respectively.
HSCL = (HSCLinputs ,HSCLoutputs)
HSSV = (HSSVinputs ,HSSVoutputs)
HSCLinputs = {| obtainResponse, validData, invalidData |}
HSCLoutputs = {| processData, validateData |}
HSSVinputs = {| receiveRequest, validateInformation |}
HSSVoutputs = {| sendResponse, validInformation, invalidInformation |}
The interface HSCL contains the events for requiring data validation and processing, and the interface HSSV offers the events
for processing the requests and for validating information. The data types communicated by each event are presented in the
next section.
3.2. Dynamic behaviour
In practice, interfaces allow us to sort out several interaction issues when putting components together. However, it
is widely recognised that this kind of (signature) interoperability is not sufficient for ensuring the correct development of
component-based applications [16,32]. Apart from a static representation provided by interfaces, a complementary one is
to express components in terms of their dynamic behaviour [32]. This describes how a component reaches different states
during its execution, based on both internal (and external) events and actions.
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Fig. 3. Component dynamic behaviour: (a) client statechart (b) server statechart.
As an example, we present the dynamic behaviour of CLIENT and SERVER in Fig. 3, using UML State Diagrams [31,33].
Input events are represented as annotations on the arrows, while output events are placed inside the edges. The CLIENT
component (see Fig. 3.a) is able to receive data from the environment, validate such data, request data processing from
another component, and wait for a response. The data validation and processing are not provided by the component itself.
This data treatment is expected to be performed by another component, through the events in the interfaceHSCL. The SERVER
component (see Fig. 3.b) is able to receive a request, perform some processing, validate information and send a response to
the requester.
Using CSP, we adopt a component model semantics complementary to other existing ADLs [30], such as Wright [16],
rCOS [34] UML-RT [33]. By dealing with components as black-boxes at composition, we present only the semantics related
to the observational dynamic behaviour of a component. This is, for instance, a subset of what is defined in [34,33], which
also considers internal actions.
Considering the CLIENT and SERVER example, the following is the specification of the CLIENT dynamic behaviour in
CSP and the data types it uses. In our specification, we assume that a request event takes the form ch?x, where ch is the
name of a channel and x acts as an input variable. The notation ch!v is used for response events, where v is an expression.
This component uses the ClientData, ClientError , and ClientResponse types to represent the data being processed, validation
errors, and actual processing results, respectively. The specification starts with the declaration of the channels that can
communicate values of those data types.
channel getUserData, validateData, processData : ClientData
channel invalidData, displayErrorMsg : ClientError
channel validData
channel obtainResponse, displayResponse : ClientResponse
CLIENTCOM = getUserData?data→ validateData!data→
((invalidData?error → displayErrorMsg!error → SKIP)
u
(validData→ processData!data→ obtainResponse?resp→
displayResponse!resp→ SKIP))
CLIENT = CLIENTCOM o9 CLIENT
The process CLIENT repeatedly behaves as CLIENTCOM . The sequential composition operator o9 composes two processes:
P o9 Q . The data processing starts by acquiring data from the environment using the channel getUserData. Next, the prefix
operator (→) states that the event validateData!data takes place, representing the validation hot spot invocation. Then,
CLIENTCOM offers two choices non-deterministically (u): it engages either in the events validData or invalidData, for valid or
invalid data, respectively. This completes the validation hot spot. The actual data processing is started by the occurrence of
the processData event and can be completed by the obtainResponse event. The events displayErrorMsg and displayResponse
inform the environment about the operation result: a validation error or the result of the processing, respectively. SKIP is a
primitive process that stands for a successful termination. It behaves like P until it terminates successfully (SKIP); when it
behaves like Q .
Note that some channels declared above are not in theHSCL interface presented in the previous section. The reason is that
HSCL is an interface for communicationwith the server, whereas the events getUserData, displayErrorMsg and displayResponse
would be part of an interface with the user.
Now we present the SERVER dynamic behaviour in CSP. The types ServerInformation, ServerRequest and ServerResponse
represent the information to be validated, the requests to be processed, and the processing responses used by SERVER,
respectively.
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channel receiveRequest, processRequest : ServerRequest
channel sendResponse, invalidInformation : ServerResponse
channel validateInformation : ServerInformation
channel validInformation
SERVERCOM =
receiveRequest?req→ processRequest.req→u resp : ServerResponse • sendResponse!resp→ SKIP
2
validateInformation?info→ (
validInformation→ SKIP
u
(umsg : ServerResponse • invalidInformation!msg → SKIP))
SERVER = SERVERCOM o9 SERVER
The process SERVER repeatedly performs the process SERVERCOM . This process offers a deterministic choice (2) between
a processing and a validation service. The request for processing is represented by the occurrence of the communication
receiveRequest?req. The next step is the processing execution, processRequest.req. The processing ends with the response
being sent back to the caller, sendResponse!resp; the value of the response is internally chosen by SERVER itself (u resp :
ServerResponse). The validation operation starts when the process engages in the communication validateInformation?info.
The choice between returning whether the information is valid (validInformation) or invalid (invalidInformation!msg) is
nondeterministic and marks the termination of the validation interface.
3.3. Component contract
We represent a component contract by its interfaces and dynamic behaviour, as follows:
Definition 2 (Contract). A component contract Ctr is a pair (interfaces, behaviour)where
1. Ctr.interfaces is a set of interfaces;
2. Ctr.behaviour is a CSP process whose alphabet is defined by Ctr.interfaces:
(a) Ctr.inputs =⋃I:Ctr.interfaces I.inputs;
(b) Ctr.outputs =⋃I:Ctr.interfaces I.outputs;
(c) αCtr.behaviour = Ctr.inputs ∪ Ctr.outputs.
In the definition above, the alphabets of input and output events of the component are delimited by the component
interfaces. The expression
⋃
SS, for a set of sets SS, yields the distributed union of all sets in SS. In our example, the dynamic
behaviour of CLIENT and SERVERwith their respective interfaces define their contract.
3.4. Communication protocols
Naturally, specifications of the component behaviour at different abstraction levels are desirable depending on the
circumstances. For instance, it is convenient to express component communications using protocols that specify allowed
execution traces of the component services (accessed via interfaces), with an exclusive focus on events. Dynamic behaviour
and protocol have a semantic relationship in nature, being commonly specified in a similar notation, but at different
granularity levels. A protocol is in fact a projection of the entire dynamic behaviour over the corresponding interface For
instance, the protocol in Fig. 4.
Consequently, we consider that a component may have several protocols and interfaces that are partitioned in the
number of its interactions with other components in the system [12]; each interface has a corresponding protocol that
can be automatically obtained by projection, as formalised in Definition 3. In this definition, the operator P  X stands for
the projection of P over the alphabet X; only events within X are visible in P  X .
Definition 3 (Protocol). Let Ctr be a component contract and I an interface, such that I ∈ Ctr.interfaces. The protocol of the
interface I (denoted by ProtCtr(I)) is defined as
ProtCtr(I) = Ctr.behaviour  αI
The restriction operator P  X can be defined in terms of the CSP operator P \ Y , where all events within Y are hidden
from P; only events within αP and not in Y are visible in P \ Y . For example Q = (a → b → SKIP) \ {a} is the same as
Q = b→ SKIP , which is also the same as Q = (a→ b→ SKIP)  {b}.
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Fig. 4. The projection of the client dynamic behaviour into a protocol.
The protocols of CLIENT and SERVER through the interfaces HSCL and HSSV are expressed by the processes PROTCL and
PROTSV , respectively.
PROTCL =u data : ClientData • validateData!data→ (
(invalidData?error → PROTCL)
u
(validData→ processData!data→ obtainResponse?resp→ PROTCL))
PROTSV =
receiveRequest?req→ u rsp : ServerResponse • sendResponse!rsp→ PROTSV
2
validateInformation?info→ (
(validInformation→ PROTSV )
u
(umsg : ServerResponse • invalidInformation!msg → PROTSV ))
Note that both PROTCL and PROTSV repeatedly perform the actions of CLIENT and SERVER defined in HSCL and HSSV ,
respectively. They accept all events communicated by CLIENT and SERVER in those interfaces, and refuse to communicate
any events that their component originally refused to communicate within these interfaces.
3.5. Semantic models
The static and behavioural aspects introduced in this section consider components in isolation. However, CBSE is
described not only by static or behavioural aspects of the components, but also by component interactions. As a consequence,
common design activities (such as compositions, updates and refinements) are defined in terms of component relationships.
In this work, these relationships can be formalised in terms of the CSP semantic models.
The process algebra CSP has semanticmodels based on: traces, failures and failures-divergences [14]. In the tracesmodel,
a process is represented by the set of finite sequences of communications it can perform. In the failures model, a process
is represented by its traces, as in the traces model, and also by its failures. A failure is a pair (s, X), where s is a trace of the
process and X is the set of events the process can refuse to perform after s is performed. Finally, in the failures-divergences
model, a process is represented by its stable failures together with its divergences. A divergence is a finite trace during or
after which the process can perform an infinite sequence of consecutive internal actions (a livelock). Like the failures model,
the stable failures also record pairs in the form (s, X); however, the sequences s are those that reach a stable state where
no transition is chosen nondeterministically. In other words, stable states are those in which there are no choices between
external and internal actions. The stable failures of a process P is denoted by failures⊥(P).
Divergences in a CSP process may result from unguarded recursions as, for example, the process P = P , or by hiding
external actions. For instance, the process Q = (a → Q ) \ {a} converts the external event A into an internal action τ .
Therefore, Q indefinitely performs internal actions, which leads to a divergence. As a consequence, Q and P have the same
behaviour in the failures-divergences model.
It is commonly accepted that the failures-divergences model gives us the most satisfactory representation for analysing
liveness and safety properties of a CSP process. However, when we look into the mathematical theory of how divergences
are calculated, it turns out that seeing accurately what a process can do after it has already been able to diverge is very
difficult, and not really worth the effort [14]. Combining traces with stable failures (which is in fact the failures part of the
failures-divergences model) makes it possible to see beyond any divergence by ignoring divergences altogether. Moreover,
it is sometimes advantageous to analyse a divergence-free process P by placing it in a context in which it may diverge as the
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result of hiding some set of actions; this only works when the traces and stable failures in this context are not influenced by
these divergences.
For instance, the process P = (a → P 2 b → P) \ {b} diverges in its initial state. The hiding operation converts
the external choice (2) into an internal choice (u). Therefore, the process internally chooses between the external event A
and an internal action resulted from hiding b. As a consequence, P may indefinitely perform internal actions, which in the
failures-divergences model leads to divergence.
As we discuss in the next section, in our formalisation of some conformance notions, it is not convenient that certain
hidden events result in divergence. For example, our intention is that the communication protocols of divergence-free
components are also divergence-free processes, even after hiding all events not in the protocol interface. Therefore, we
assume in thiswork software components that are divergence-free, anduse the stable failuresmodel to performverifications
on these components.
4. A component model for interaction components
All component technologies are developed to achieve specific design goals and some are used to specify and reason
about the behaviour of software systems. However, as envisaged in [35], it is necessary to consciously design component
technologies to enable automated and trustworthy analysis andprediction of systembehaviour. This is achieved by imposing
design and implementation rules on component developers and application integrators (assemblers) through a component
model or an architectural style [36]. Both define component types, patterns of interaction, and other design constraints. The
significance of this observation is that a system property (for instance, reliability) strongly correlates to its architectural
structure. If all these constructive constraints are satisfied, an assembly can be constructed, that is, its components can be
integrated, deployed, and so forth.
To achieve that, we define in this work a component model for interaction components. The constructive constraints for
this componentmodel are based on the notions of substitutability and compatibility of software components. These notions
allow one to checkwhether a given component can successfully replace another in a particular application, andwhether two
components are compatible for them to interoperate, respectively. In the next sections we formally define the interaction
component type and these notions.
4.1. Interaction components
In this work, we focus on components that repeatedly present the same behaviour to the environment. Such a recurring
behaviour is called here an interaction process, which is itself defined in terms of interaction patterns [37]. Each interaction
pattern consists of a finite sequence of events (which represent component services) that when performed leads the
component (interaction process) back to its initial state. In this manner, the component repeatedly offers these sequences of
events, similar to possible transactions (including compensating actions) performed against a databasemanagement system.
These patterns cover a wide range of applications, like transactional stateful components found in several technologies such
as, for instance, Session Enterprise JavaBeansTM and transactional conversational Web Services.
Observing components defined as an interaction process, we note that additional properties should be considered in this
domain. In particular, its similarity with transactional components suggests that ACID properties [38] might be relevant.
ACID is a set of properties to guarantee that database transactions are processed reliably. Similarly to an interaction pattern,
a transaction represents a single logical operation,whichmight consist ofmultiple individual events. For instance, a database
transaction could have one of the following actions: connect, insert or select entries and commit all changes; or connect,
change some entries and rollback. In both cases, we have patterns that may repeat in the component life-time. Except for
the Durability property, concernedwith transaction persistence, the following ACID properties are relevant to guarantee the
reliability of interaction patterns.
Atomicity refers to the guarantee that either all the actions of an interaction pattern or none of them are performed.
Consistency ensures that the component (interaction process) remains in a consistent state before the start of an interaction
pattern and after it is complete.
Isolation refers to the ability of the component to perform actions in an interaction pattern that cannot be interfered with
by actions in another, possibly concurrent, interaction pattern.
To present the interaction patterns of a process P (InteractionPatterns(P)), we use the CSP operator P/s. If s ∈ traces(P)
then P/s (pronounced ‘P after s’) represents the behaviour of P after the trace s is performed. So, InteractionPatterns(P) is
the set of traces that lead the process to its initial state.
Definition 4 (Interaction Patterns). Let P be a CSP process. The interaction patterns of P (denoted InteractionPatterns(P)) are
{s : traces(P) | failures⊥(P) = failures⊥(P/s)}
Definition 4 is characterised in terms of the CSP stable failures semanticmodel, as introduced in Section 3.5. It defines the set
of traces after which the process presents the same failures; these are precisely the interaction patterns of P . To guarantee
Atomicity and Consistencywe define a process P in terms of interaction patterns (an interaction process). Its tracesmust be a
prefix () of an interaction pattern or of a combination of them.Note that in either case they belong to InteractionPatterns(P).
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Definition 5 (Interaction Process). A divergence-free CSP process P is an interaction process if, and only if:
∀ s ∈ traces(P) • ∃ p : InteractionPatterns(P) • s  p
Based on the above definition, we are able to define components that behave as interaction processes.
Definition 6 (Interaction Component). Let C be a component with contract Ctr . Then C is an interaction component if, and
only if, Ctr.behaviour is an interaction process.
We consider that an interaction pattern may present default interactions or compensating interactions (when faults
occur). We do not focus on differentiating between them, nor on the detection of fault events. We are concerned with
whether the complete pattern of services has been performed or not (Atomicity), and whether after one interaction pattern
finishes, the process returns to a state where it can initiate other interaction patterns (Consistency). Observe that defining
interaction patterns as above, only one interaction pattern can be performed at a time; in other words, all patterns are
serialised (the simplest way of obtaining Isolation). These properties help us in further verifications in this paper.
Observe that interaction components have their dynamic behaviour and, as a consequence, their protocols defined as
interaction processes.
Theorem 7 (Interaction Protocol). Let Ctr be a component contract of an interaction component, and I an interface in
Ctr.interfaces. Then ProtCtr(I) is an interaction process.
Proof Sketch. From Definition 3, ProtCtr(I) = Ctr.behaviour  αI . As Ctr.behaviour is an interaction process and ProtCtr(I)
simply restricts the events of Ctr.behaviour to αI , then ProtCtr(I) is an interaction process. 
Overall, in practice we can simply represent interaction processes solely in terms of the set of their interaction patterns.
As a result, any interaction process P can be defined as a recursive process of the form P = Q o9 P , where the traces of
the finite process Q represent interaction patterns of P . A default implementation for a set of interaction patterns T of an
interaction component with contract Ctr is PDefaultImp(T , Ctr) defined as follows.
Theorem 8 (Default Behaviour Implementation). Let IS be a set of interfaces, T a set of interaction patterns, and PDefaultImp(T , IS)
given by:
PDefaultImp(T , IS) = PImp(〈〉,⋃I:IS I.inputs,⋃I:IS I.outputs, T ) o9
PDefaultImp(T , IS)
PImp(s, is, os, T ) = (2 ai : enabled(s, is, T ) • ai → PImp(s_〈ai〉, is, os, T ))
2
(u ao : enabled(s, os, T ) • ao → PImp(s_〈ao〉, is, os, T ))
2 s ∈ (T − {〈〉}) & SKIP
enabled(s, X, T ) = {a : X | ∃ t : T • s_〈a〉 ≺ t}
Then Ctr = (IS, PDefaultImp(T , IS)) is a contract for an interaction component.
Proof Sketch. We have to show that PDefaultImp(T , IS) is an interaction process. Analysing the process PImp(s, is, os, T ), we
observe that this process is divergence-free; it forbids any loop of internal action in its definition. There are two loops in
PDefaultImp(T , IS). The first one recursively invokes the process PImp(...), and the second one performs all traces within an
interaction pattern; the process enabled(...) verifies whether an event belongs to the interaction pattern that is currently
being performed. The second loop only finishes when an interaction pattern is completely performed, in which case it
behaves like SKIP . The process PImp(...) represents all interaction patterns. After an entire interaction pattern is performed
(end of the second loop), the component returns to its initial state (first loop). As a consequence, we conclude that
PDefaultImp(T , IS) is an interaction process. 
In the next subsections we explore relevant properties of interaction components.
4.2. Substitutability
Behavioural subtyping is a strong form of relationship between two (component) types. It requires instances of a subtype
and of a supertype to fulfil the principle of type substitutability [39]:
1. An instance of the subtype should be usable wherever an instance of the supertype is expected, without a client being
able to tell the difference.
This suggests the use of some form of refinement [14] to formalise behavioural subtyping. Refinement guarantees
substitutability in an even stronger form: a system can always be replaced by its refinement without any noticeable
difference. For subtyping, we want only that a replacement be unnoticeable at places where a supertype is expected. This
is a weaker form of substitutability, but that nevertheless can be characterised in terms of refinement [40]. Refinement
definitions vary according to the semantic model adopted. As we discussed in Section 3.5, for capturing substitutability we
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adopt the stable failures semantic model. A process C is a stable failures refinement [14] of A (denoted A vF⊥ C) if, and only
if, its traces are contained in A’s, and it presents fewer stable failures; it refuses fewer communications.
failures⊥(C) ⊆ failures⊥(A) ∧ traces(C) ⊆ traces(A)
This characterises that the process C can bemore deterministic than A. Refinement is an appropriate subtyping relation only
when there is no extension of functionality. However, it must be emphasised that using refinement together with additional
CSP operators, it is possible to characterise other subtype relationships, and thus extend functionality.
For instance, consider the process CLIENT presented in Section 3.2. At a certain point, after requesting a data validation
(validateData event), it nondeterministically chooses between accepting either the response invalidData or validData (and
refuses the other). Both events are possible responses. By taking the decision of accepting one and refusing the other, this
processmight present communication problems after the request for validation. This is a common integration problem [27],
called communication deadlock. A solution is to use a more deterministic process CLIENT ′ (such that CLIENT vF⊥ CLIENT ′)
defined below. It simply replaces the nondeterministic choice operator in CLIENT with a deterministic one.
CLIENT ′COM = getUserData?data→ validateData!data→
((invalidData?error → displayErrorMsg!error → SKIP)
2
(validData→ processData!data→ obtainResponse?resp→
displayResponse!resp→ SKIP))
CLIENT ′ = CLIENT ′COM o9 CLIENT ′
A possible implementation subtyping [40] relation in CSP for the extension of functionality is: the additional events in the
implementation are hidden and afterwards the implementation is compared with the abstract specification. The additional
events may either be new operations of the component or services of other component instances called by the component.
As it extends functionalities, we explicitly state that all traces are guaranteed.
Definition 9 (Implementation Subtyping). Let C and A be CSP process, such that αA ⊆ αC , and N = (αC − αA). C is an
implementation subtype of A (denoted A vist C) if, and only if:
failures⊥(C) \ N ⊆ failures⊥(A) ∧ traces(C \ N) ⊆ traces(A) ∧
∀ t : Σ∗, a : N, b : αA • {t_〈a〉, t_〈b〉} * traces(C)
The hiding operation on the stable failures set is defined as follows.
F⊥ \ N = {(s, X) | ∃(s′, Y ) ∈ F⊥, s = s′ \ N ∧ X ⊆ Y ∧ N ⊆ Y }
Hiding someeventsmakes them internal to the component. The refusals of a trace s (inwhich the eventswithinN are hidden)
are equal to the refusals of the original trace s′. This is only analysed for the states where no outgoing transition triggered
by events in N is allowed (expressed by N ⊆ Y ); these are stable states. So, hiding makes states that offer events within
N unstable (and thus no refusal is computed for these states). The expression that checks all traces (∀ t : Σ∗...) states that
Definition 9 is valid only for processes that forbid choices between events in N and other events in the process alphabet. The
reason is that events in N represent internal actions of the process, and permitting such choices would possibly introduce
deadlocks in the component. As a consequence of this condition, the component with hidden events is also an interaction
process.
Lemma 10. Let C and A be CSP processes such that C is an implementation subtype of A (denoted A vist C), and A is an interaction
process. Then C is an interaction process.
Proof Sketch. From Definition 9, no choice between new events in N and old events in αA is specified in C . This neither
introduces possible divergences after hiding events in N , nor prevents interaction patterns from repeatedly leading the
component (interaction process) to its initial state. 
The implementation subtype relation is useful when a component A is replaced with a component C in a context where
the new operations introduced by C are not used. For instance, when the operations are internal actions of the component
that specialises old services. Nevertheless, in a context where the new operations are used by another component, the
implementation subtype relation is unable to capture an appropriate notion of substitutability as, for example, when the new
operation leads the component to a state unexpected by other components.
Consider a component A as on the left-hand side of Fig. 5. It communicates with two independent parts of the system
(the environments Env1 and Env2). These two distinct environments do not communicate, unless through such a component.
We want to replace this component with another one that supports a new environment Env3 (assumed to be independent
of Env1 and Env2); see the right-hand side of Fig. 5. All communications of the environment Env3 with the component are
new and, therefore, must not interfere with the communications of Env1 and Env2. The implementation subtype relation is
unable to capture such a substitution, since, for instance, by hiding communications of Env3 in the context of Env1 we do
not forbid the environment to lead the component to states unexpected by Env1.
A common substitution relationship that considers sharing, as in the above scenario, is based on the use of substitution
functions [39,40]:
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Fig. 5. A component that integrate two distinct environments.
2. The execution of new operations may only lead the component to expected states.
Substitution functions allow us to relate communications in Env3 with communications in Env1 and Env2 in order
to show that all communications in the new environment (Env3) do not lead the component to an unexpected state.
Therefore we characterise the new communication context (with Env3) as a new interface IN , and explain all interaction
patterns in this interface by interaction patterns communicatedwith the environment Env1. To facilitate our characterisation
all communications with Env1 are also represented by an interface I . All new communications in IN are observed by
Env2 as interactions of I . All new communications in IN are observed by Env1 as empty traces. To achieve that the new
componentmustmanage the communicationwith these environments, avoiding interaction patterns in IN and in I executing
concurrently (Isolation). In this way, we also avoid that an environment leads the component to a state unexpected by the
other ones. Therefore, informally, the new subtyping relation that we need can be summarised as follows.
3. All interaction patterns on new interfaces should be observed as either empty traces or interaction patterns in older
interfaces.
The following operation on stable failures is important for the formalisation of this substitutability definition. The traces are
represented using a substitution function FIN ↪→I , which maps sequences of traces of C .behaviour into sequences of traces of
A.behaviour; see the components A and C in Fig. 5. This function behaves as an identity for events in the original alphabet
(αA) and as a partial function for sequences of new events (communicated via IN ). Using a partial function, we are able to
describe the unstable states that are not defined in the original component: those in which new events are pending in order
to map a sequence of events of IN into events of I . In the definition below assume that N = αIN = αC − αA, Σ = αC ,
αI ⊆ αA. Moreover, consider F = failures⊥(C .behaviour)
F \FIN ↪→I N = {(a, X) | ∃(a′, Y ) ∈ F ∧ a′ ∈ dom FIN ↪→I , a = FIN ↪→I(a′)∧ X ⊆ Y ∪ N}
where FIN ↪→I : Σ∗ → (Σ − N)∗, is defined as follows:
FIN ↪→I(s
_t) = s_FIN ↪→I(t), s ∈ (Σ − N)∗
FIN ↪→I(n
_t) = s_FIN ↪→I(t), n ∈ N∗ ∧ s ∈ αI∗
Basically, the operator above states that any interaction pattern of A may be performed by C , whereas new interaction
patterns are only allowed when Env3 chooses them. New events of C in such new patterns are explained by events of A,
and new interaction patterns are explained by interaction patterns of A. All states in which new sequences of events are
not explained by events of I are unstable states as well. The function FIN ↪→I explains all new events in C by events of A. This
function is abstractly defined in the operator above, since it is specified by the user for each pair of components A and C .
The subtyping relation based on the substitution function is defined as follows.
Definition 11 (Interaction Subtyping). Let C ,A be interaction processes, IN and I interfaces, and FIN ↪→I a substitution function,
such that N = αIN = αC−αA,Σ = αC , αI ⊆ αA. C is an interaction subtype of Awith respect to FIN ↪→I (denoted A vNintst C)
if, and only if:
(failures⊥(C)\FIN↪→I N) ⊆ failures⊥(A) ∧ traces(C \N) ⊆ traces(A) ∧ (1)
(∀ t : Σ∗, a : N, b : αI | {t_〈a〉, t_〈b〉} ⊆ traces(C) (2)
• (t, {〈a〉}) /∈ failures⊥(C) ∧ (t, {〈b〉}) /∈ failures⊥(C)) ∧ (3)
(∀ t : (Σ∗ − 〈〉) | t ∈ InteractionPatterns(C) ∧ (4)
(@s : (Σ∗ − 〈〉) | s ∈ InteractionPatterns(C) ∧ s ≺ t) (5)
• ((t \ αI = t) ∨ (t \ αN = t)) ∧ (6)
((t \ N 6= 〈〉) ∨ (t \ αI 6= 〈〉) ∨ (t \ (αA− αI) 6= 〈〉)) (7)
C is an interaction subtype of A if, and only if: (1) all sequences of new events in C can be explained to external observers as
events in A (line 1); (2) Choices between events of IN and I are deterministically chosen by the environment (line 3); (3) No
interactionpattern contains both events of IN and I (line 6); (4)No interactionpattern is formedonly of events communicated
with either Env1, Env2 or Env3 (line 7). As a result, every time a new interaction patterns of IN is performed, events of I are
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blocked until the pattern is performed. This explains why pattern of I and IN do not interfere in the execution of each other
(Isolation). They are serialised and, therefore, not performed at the same time. All states that communicate events in IN and
do not enable events in I are unstable. The stable states that offer events of I and IN are exactly those that need a (external)
decision on which patterns to perform: either new interaction patterns of IN or the patterns of I .
As we define our substitutability notion in the stable failures, we need to derive a testing characterisation that can be
performed in practical model-checkers, such as FDR. These tools perform refinements in the traces, stable failures and
failures-divergences models of CSP. The testing characterisation is obtained by constructing a tester process from the
subtype C , and checking the refinement between the supertype A and the tester of C . The tester is represented by the
following process Tester , which repeatedly synchronises C with the patterns (old or new).
Tester(C, I, IN , FIN ↪→I) = ((C[| αI |]New2Old(C, FIN ↪→I)) \ αIN)[R−]
New2Old(C, FIN ↪→I) = PImp′(〈〉, InteractionPatterns(C), FIN ↪→I)
o
9 New2Old(C, FIN ↪→I)
PImp′(s, T , FIN ↪→I) = (2 a : enabled(is, T ) • ChkPerfNew(s, a, FIN ↪→I)[R] o9
a→ PImp′(s_〈a〉, T ))
2 s ∈ (T − {〈〉}) & PerfNew(s, FIN ↪→I)
R and R− are injective renaming functions, R(a) = a if a /∈ αI , R(a) = a′ ∈ I ′ if a ∈ αI; I ′ = {ev′ | ev ∈ αI}. R− is the
inverse function of R.
In Tester , the process C is synchronised with New2Old(C, FIN ↪→I), which synchronises in any interaction pattern of C .
New2Old(C, FIN ↪→I) is defined in terms of the process PImp′ which performs all interaction patterns in T (similar to the
auxiliary process PImp in Theorem 8). As New2Old is aimed to synchronise with C , all choices in PImp′ are deterministic.
Every time an event is performed, the processes ChkPerfNew and PerfNew are invoked in order to check whether the last
new events can be explained in terms of old ones. To avoid undesirable synchronisations the renaming functions R and R−
are used. In fact, R− is the inverse of R and undoes all renamings of R. Finally, all new events within N are hidden from the
tester process. Note that only well-formed substitution functions would not deadlock this tester process.
ChkPerfNew(t, a, FIN ↪→I) = PerfNew(t, FIN ↪→I) <| a ∈ N |> SKIP
PerfNew(〈〉, FIN ↪→I) = SKIP
PerfNew(n, FIN ↪→I) = (Perform(FIN ↪→I(n)) <| n ∈ domFIN ↪→I |> SKIP), n ∈ N∗
PerfNew(s_〈a〉_n, FIN ↪→I) = (Perform(FIN ↪→I(n))
<| n ∈ domFIN ↪→I |> SKIP), n ∈ N∗ ∧ a /∈ N
Perform(〈〉) = SKIP
Perform(〈a〉_s) = a→ Perform(s)
The process ChkPerfNew checks if a sequence of new events has been completely performed. The verification is done
using the condition operator P <| cond |> Q . If cond is evaluated true then P is performed. Otherwise, Q is performed. PerfNew
represents the new events using the substitution function FIN ↪→I . Every time a sequence of new events in N is performed,
PerfNew performs events in I that represents such new events. The auxiliary process Perform receives a sequence of events
and generates a process whose maximum trace is this sequence.
The following theorem relates the denotational definition of interaction subtype with the one based on process failures
refinement, which can be mechanically carried out by practical model checkers. Note that the Tester process introduces all
events in αA that explain new events of C . When these events are introduced, Tester is concerned only with the mapping
of traces. As a result, A vNintst C if A is refined by the Tester process in the traces model. The refusals can be directly verified
from refinement relations of A and C in each context A is expected (Env1 and Env2). The hiding and the restriction operators
are used below to define such contexts.
Theorem 12. Let A and C be interaction processes, and IS the set of interfaces of A, such that αA ⊂ αC, N = αC − αA. Then A is
an interaction subtype of C (A vNintst C) if:
A vT Tester(C, I, IN , FIN ↪→I) ∧
A \ I vF C \ I ∧
A  I vF C  I
Proof Sketch. Definition 11 states that: all sequences of new events in C can be explained to external observers as
events in A. The proof of this statement is divided into two parts. First we check the traces of all processes involved.
Tester(C, I, IN , FIN ↪→I) performs the same traces as those of A, considering that the substitution function FIN ↪→I consistently
represents all new sequences of events of C in terms of events of A (line 1, Definition 11). As a result,
traces(Tester(C, I, IN , FIN ↪→I)) ⊆ traces(A)
For the failures set, we consider the assumption that the environment is partitioned in Env1 and Env2 (see Fig. 5), and that
only comparisons of failures concerning these partitions are necessary (lines 2-6, Definition 11). We need to show that
• (failures⊥(C) \FIN ↪→I αIN) \ (αC − (αA− αI)) = failures(C \ (αC − (αA− αI)))• (failures⊥(C) \FIN ↪→I αIN) \ (αC − αI) = failures(C \ (αC − αI))
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Using the hiding operator, the communication is restricted to the alphabet used by Env1 or by Env2, also hiding all events of
IN . All hidden events are internal. As C is assumed to be divergence free, the set failures⊥(C) \FIN ↪→I αIN contains all states
that offer events to Env1 and Env3. Moreover, as there is no interaction pattern composed only of events communicated
either with Env1, Env2, or Env3 (line 7, Definition 11), no unstable state is introduced after hiding these events. Therefore,
the expressions in the stable failures semantic model are equivalent to the ones in the failures semantic model. 
With this theorem we have a mechanical way of checking substitutability of components.
4.3. Compatibility
While substitution is related to the update of a component in an architecture, compatibility checks the relation of
two connected components in the architecture. As a consequence, instead of considering the entire specification of
the components, compatibility checks the protocols and interfaces used in the communication. Before presenting the
compatibility notion for protocols, some relevant concepts that underly our notion are required: dual interfaces and safety
acceptance processes.We say that an interface I is dual to an interface J if all output events of I are inputs of J , and vice-versa.
Moreover, the respective sets of inputs and outputs of these interfaces are disjoint.
Definition 13 (Dual Interfaces). Let I and J be interfaces. I is dual of J if, and only if:
I.outputs ⊆ J.inputs ∧ J.outputs ⊆ I.inputs ∧
(I.inputs ∩ J.inputs) ∪ (I.outputs ∩ J.outputs) = ∅
The acceptance notion relates processes Q and R with respect to the subsets Y of their alphabets. The definition states
that: every time an event within Y is enabled in R it is also enabled in Q . The safety acceptance is a stronger notion that
includes acceptance. It relates Q with Rwith respect to Y and another subset X of their alphabet. In addition to acceptance,
the definition states that Q never deadlocks waiting for an event within X that does not come from R.
Definition 14 (Acceptance). Let Q and R be CSP processes, Y be a set of events, such that Y ⊆ αQ . Then Q matches the
traces of Rwith respect to Y (denoted by Q acceptsY R) if, and only if
∀ t : αR∗, a : Y | tˆ〈a〉 ∈ traces(R) • (t, {〈a〉}) /∈ failures(Q )
Definition 15 (Safety Acceptance). Let Q and R be CSP processes, and X and Y sets of events, such that X ⊆ αR, Y ⊆ αQ
and Y ⊆ X . Then Q matches the traces of Rwith respect to X and Y (denoted by Q safacceptsX,Y R) if, and only if:
1. Q acceptsY R
2. ∀ t : αQ ∗, a : X | tˆ〈a〉 ∈ traces(Q ) • (t, X) /∈ failures(R)
For simplicity, we write Q acceptsY Q as Q acceptsY , and Q safacceptsY ,Y R as Q safacceptsY R. For instance, we say that
a component C obeys input acceptance if it satisfies C .behaviour acceptsC .inputs. This means that C never refuses an input
event defined in its traces.
Based on these concepts, we can define an important notion of compatible protocols: protocols whose communication
(resulting from their synchronisation) is deadlock-free; they always accept communications from each other.
Definition 16 (Protocol Compatibility). Let I and J be two dual interfaces of two distinct components with contracts Ctr1 and
Ctr2, respectively. Their protocols ProtCtr1(I) and ProtCtr2(J) are compatible if, and only if, each one safely accepts the output
traces of the other.
ProtCtr1(I) safacceptsI.inputs,J.outputs ProtCtr2(J)
ProtCtr2(J) safacceptsJ.inputs,I.outputs ProtCtr1(I)
This is an effective way of ensuring that the communication between two components is deadlock-free. This notion is
related to Stuck-freedom conformance for CCS processes [41], concerning events in X , but we consider only synchronous
communication. In general, we only synchronise components that obey input acceptance, since they refuse input events that
could be accepted in their protocols.
A testing characterisation of this notion via refinement can be defined upon a special process, called dual protocol [12].
We define the dual of a protocol Q as a process whose sets of inputs and outputs are equal to Q .outputs and Q .inputs,
respectively, and whose interaction patterns are both given by InteractionPatterns(ProtCtr1(I)). Moreover, it safely accepts
Q .outputs and it is totally non-deterministic with respect to the other events (Q .inputs).
Definition 17 (Dual Protocol). Let I be an interface of a component contract Ctr . The dual protocol of ProtCtr(I) is defined as
the process DProtCtr(I), such that:
traces(DProtCtr(I)) = traces(ProtCtr(I)) ∧
DProtCtr(I) acceptsI.outputs ProtCtr(I) ∧∀ s : traces(DProtCtr(I)) | b ∈ I.inputs • (s, {b}) ∈ failures(DProtCtr(I))
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A systematic way to obtain the dual protocol of the default one of an interface I is by replacing the choices (internal
or external) within ProtCtr(I) with internal (nondeterministic) ones in places where input communications are involved,
and with external choices where only output communications are involved. This strategy allows implementations that
communicate with the protocol to decide how they provide these inputs. Alternatively, a dual protocol can also be obtained
by changing the parameters of the default implementation of the interaction patterns of a protocol. Suppose T is the set
of interaction patterns of ProtCtr(I), then DProtCtr(I) = PImp(〈〉, I.outputs, I.inputs, T ) (see Theorem 8). In our example (see
Section 3.4), the dual protocols ofHSCL andHSSV are respectively expressed by the processesDUALPCL andDUALPSV , as follows:
DUALPCL = (validateData?data→ (u err : ClientError • invalidData!err → SKIP
u
validData→ processData.data→
(u resp : ClientResponse • obtainResponse!resp→ SKIP))
) o9 DUALPCL
DUALPSV = (u r : ServerRequest • receiveRequest!r → sendResponse?x→ SKIP
2u info : ServerInformation • validateInformation!info→ (
validInformation→ SKIP
2
invalidInformation?msg → SKIP)) o9 DUALPSV
The following theorem addresses the test characterisation of the compatibility definition given in terms of a denotational
semantics (Definition 16).
Theorem 18. Let I and J be two interfaces of distinct component contracts Ctr1 and Ctr2, such that all protocols of Ctr1 obey input
acceptance. Then ProtCtr2(J) is compatible with ProtCtr1(I) if DProtCtr1(I) vF⊥ ProtCtr2(J).
Proof Sketch. From Definition 17, DProtCtr1(I) accepts all output events of ProtCtr1(I), and traces(DProtCtr(I)) = traces
(ProtCtr(I)). As a result, the process DProtCtr1(I) never deadlocks waiting for an output event that does not come from
ProtCtr1(I). Furthermore, the dual protocol safety accepts all outputs of the default protocol (DProtCtr1(I) safacceptsI.outputs
ProtCtr1(I)). The same is obtained from communications from ProtCtr1(I) to DProtCtr1(I). As ProtCtr1(I) obeys input acceptance,
ProtCtr1(I) safacceptsI.inputs DProtCtr1(I). As a result, ProtCtr1(I) and DProtCtr1(I) are compatible. If DProtCtr1(I) vF⊥ ProtCtr2(J),
then ProtCtr2(J) is also compatible with ProtCtr1(I). 
With this test characterisation defined in terms of refinement, verifications can be mechanically carried out by the FDR
model checker. However, refinement checking captured by Theorem 18 cannot be directly applied to verify all possible
communications. The reason is that some components may accept more inputs than necessary in a communication, and
despite being compatible with a protocol ProtCtr(I) they do not refine the dual protocolDProtCtr(I). So, we need amechanism
that restricts the events communicated to the ones used by the protocol.
A useful process to help in verification would be a deadlock-free process that represents all possible communications
between aprotocol ProtCtr(I) and another process compatiblewith it.We call this process communication context of ProtCtr(I).
To define this process we need to consider only the protocol ProtCtr(I) and its counter-part DProtCtr(I). As the input events
of ProtCtr(I) are outputs of DProtCtr(I), we need only to specify the communication context process with respect to ProtCtr(I).
Definition 19 (Communication Context Process). Let I be an interface of a component contract Ctr , and ProtCtr(I) its default
protocol. A communication context process of I (denoted by CTXCtr(I)) is defined as:
traces(CTXCtr(I)) = traces(ProtCtr(I)) ∧
CTXCtr(I) acceptsI.inputs ProtCtr(I) ∧
CTXCtr(I) acceptsI.outputs ProtCtr(I)
A systematic way to define the communication context process of ProtCtr(I) is by using external choice for all outgoing
transitions in states of ProtCtr(I). All events must be written in the form ch?data, where ch is the name of a channel in the
interface and data is an identifier to hold possible data values associated with the interface. Alternatively, a communication
context process can also be obtained by changing the parameters of the default implementation of the interaction patterns
of a protocol. Suppose T is the set of interaction patterns of ProtCtr(I), then CTXCtr(I) = PImp(〈〉, αI,∅, T ). Analysing the
communication events of the protocols ofHSCL andHSSV in our example (see Section 3.4), we note that their communication
contexts can be expressed by the following processes CTXCL and CTXSV , respectively.
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CTXCL COM = validateData?data→ (
invalidData?error → SKIP
2
validData→ processData.data→ obtainResponse?resp→ SKIP)
CTXCL = CTXCL COM o9 CTXCL
CTXSV COM = receiveRequest?sol→ sendResponse?resp→ SKIP
2
validateInformation?info→ (validInformation→ SKIP
2
invalidInformation?msg → SKIP)
CTXSV = CTXSV COM o9 CTXSV
The definition of a communication context process allows us to restrict proofs concerning communication via a specific
interface. Considering a component whose behaviour is defined as an interaction process, the context process expresses the
interaction patterns of the protocol.
The following theorem captures a test characterisation of the communication context process (Definition 19).
Theorem 20. Let I be an interface of a component contract Ctr, ProtCtr(I) and DProtCtr(I) its default and dual protocols,
respectively. Then CTXCtr(I) satisfies:
ProtCtr(I) = ProtCtr(I)[| I |]CTXCtr(I) ∧
DProtCtr(I) = DProtCtr(I)[| I |]CTXCtr(I)
Proof Sketch. From Definition 19, CTXCtr(I) is a process that has the same traces as ProtCtr(I) and also do not refuse any
event in ProtCtr(I) (it accepts all input and output events of the protocol). According to the step-law of parallelism [14], which
allows serialising a parallelism generating all possible execution sequences, CTXCtr(I) preserves the behaviour of ProtCtr(I).
As traces(DProtCtr(I))= traces(ProtCtr), the proof for the dual protocol is straightforward. 
From Theorem 18, for protocol compatibility, and from Theorem 20, for communication context process, we are now
able to construct a stronger test characterisation for protocol compatibility.
Theorem 21. Let I and J be two interfaces of distinct component contracts Ctr1 and Ctr2, such that all protocols of Ctr1 obey input
acceptance. Then ProtCtr2(J) is compatible with ProtCtr1(I) if, and only if:
DProtCtr1(I) vF ((ProtCtr2(J)  αI) ‖αI CTXCtr(I))
DProtCtr2(J) vF ((ProtCtr1(I)  αJ) ‖αJ CTXCtr(J))
Proof Sketch. To prove that protocol compatibility (Definition 16) is equivalent to the above refinement expressions, we
have to prove two directions, showing that the refinement implies in the definition and vice-versa. Both are proved by
contradiction. Our proof is based on the analysis of deadlocks, which is the essential property that protocol compatibility
prevents. We only prove the equivalence for one of the refinement expressions, since the proof for the other follows a
similar approach.
(←) If ((ProtCtr2(J)  αI) ‖αI CTXCtr(I)) deadlocks it is because ProtCtr2(J) does not satisfy the communication context of I ,
and, furthermore, it is not compatible with ProtCtr1(I). If this process does not deadlock, then Theorem 18 applies.
(→) If ProtCtr2(J) and ProtCtr1(I) are compatible, then ProtCtr2(J) does not deadlock when synchronised with a deadlock-free
process that has the same traces as ProtCtr1(I). Therefore, ((ProtCtr2(J)  αI) ‖αI CTXCtr(I)) does not deadlock, and also
contains all traces of DProtCtr1(I). Being compatible with ProtCtr1(I), ProtCtr2(J) accepts all output events of ProtCtr1(I),
similarly to DProtCtr1(I). However, DProtCtr1(I) is non-deterministic in every possible input event of ProtCtr1(I), and
ProtCtr2(J) is equal to or more deterministic than DProtCtr1(I) concerning these events. As a result the refinement
holds. 
This concludes our conformance notions for individual components. The application of all these concepts is illustrated in
the next sections, using conformance checkings on compositions.
5. Component integration patterns
As revealed in many patterns and integration solution proposals [21,22,42,43], there are three categories of component
integration solutions: Extender, Translator and Controller [5].
Extenders add external features, such as buffering and polling, to components in order to facilitate their interaction with
other components. They act only on the architectural structure,mediating the exchange of eventswithout changing
the communication behaviour. They typically introduce orthogonal concerns to the component. Examples are
interceptors [21] and extension interfaces [43].
Translators perform data transformation, marshalling, and the mapping of data among components. They also act only on
the architectural structure. Examples are adapters [22] and converters [21].
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Fig. 6. The communication and sychronisation component (CSC): (a) structure (b) abstract behaviour.
Controllers coordinate and mediate the control flow among components [42]. They execute a predefined decision-making
heuristic, which allows the determination of which source input information to pass, modify, or discard and
to which target components valid information is transferred. A controller may have different purposes [21,22]
depending on the conflict that it resolves as, for instance, serving a structural purpose when providing a facade,
or a behavioral purpose when mediating multiple components. Examples are load balance and resource sharing
managers [5].
Many integration solution strategies combine different classes of integration. Some consider them as a first-class
architecture entity with specific functions [44,3]. This means that integration solutions may specify patterns of services
with abstract and generic interfaces at the design level, and become more concrete when assembling components [26].
We consider in this paper all these integration solutions more broadly as exogenous coordinators [4,17], intended to mean
‘coordination from outside’. Exogenous coordination separates computation from the coordination itself; this simplifies
system specification, understanding, construction, evolution and validation of properties.
As an example of a coordinator, we present the Composition and Synchronisation Component in Fig. 6. It combines the
resource manager (a controller) and the translator patterns, presented in Section 2 (see Fig. 1).
The CSC coordinator is a resource manager, managing the access to services of a component (see pattern description in
Section 2) connected to the interface HotSpotC (see Fig. 6.a). It is designed to offer these services to two clients connected
to the interfaces HotSpotA and HotSpotB. It defines the context where the component instances can communicate with the
component on HotSpotC . Moreover, it controls possible synchronisation and translation between these interfaces. Therefore
the CSC is also a translator. The interfaces HotSpotB and HotSpotC have the same alphabet, and have, in fact, dual protocols.
Everything received on HotSpotB is sent through HotSpotC , and vice-versa. From an external point of view, components on
these two interfaces are synchronised. The part of CSC responsible for this synchronisation is called CSCsync . On the other
hand, HotSpotA and HotSpotC are heterogeneous. CSC uses a translator pattern to map events and data values from one
interface to another (see pattern description in Section 2). The part responsible for the translation is called CSCcom.
To possibly reuse CSC to compose different component instances, the coordination purpose of CSC is abstractly defined
based on patterns of services of unspecified components. At the implementation level, it is specialised with the interaction
patterns of the services of each component instance it manages. As the protocol of HotSpotB is a dual of protocol of HotSpotC ,
only the interaction patterns of HotSpotA and HotSpotC are necessary. Abstractly, we could define CSC as follows.
CSC = ( CSCcom(InteractionPatterns(ProtA), InteractionPatterns(ProtC ))
2 CSCsync(InteractionPatterns(ProtC )) o9 CSC
More details about its behaviour are given in the next section.
6. Application: Formal framework composition
Before applying conformance notions on component coordination, we briefly present a composition strategy we
developed in an earlier work [27], which aims to overcome some typical problems during framework integration presented
in [6]. Such problems arise when frameworks need to be assembled with each other and with legacy components [45].
As a consequence, even at the specification level, framework composition may give rise to a number of problems, such
as incoherent control flow composition and entities overlap [6,45]. These problems are typically related to communication
incompatibilities, related to their protocols (incoherent control flow) or to the data types used in the communication (entities
overlap).
A framework can be defined as a set of classes that incorporates an abstract design to solve problems of a specific
domain [6]. A framework customisation in each domain can be performed either by extension, through specialisation of
their classes, or by composition, similarly to components, with other frameworks or applications. In [27], specialisations
are verified using ordinary CSP process refinements, like, for instance, checking the specialisation of CLIENT by CLIENT ′ in
Section 3. We focus on the customisation of frameworks by composition, which is less vulnerable to internal changes [9].
As a consequence, the interfaces of components that encapsulate the frameworks are the places where they are customised
(hot spots) and, furthermore, where they are composed. The strategy developed in [27] is also based on CSP, which allows
us to deal with property preservation of such compositions.
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Table 1
Steps of the systematic strategy to compose framework.
1. Checking properties of the original frameworks
2. Identifying composition points
3. Identifying matchings of sequences of events
4. Communication mapping
5. Composing hot spots
6. Specifying the Communication and Synchronisation Component
7. Composing the frameworks
Table 2
Processing and Validation Hot spot events.
Occurred events → Enabled events
< processData > → < receiveRequest >
< sendResponse > → < obtainResponse >
< validateData > → < validateInformation >
< validInformation > → < validData >
< invalidInformation > → < invalidData >
Table 3
Matching data type in the example.
Domain Type Generates Target type
ClientData → ServerRequest
ServerResponse → ClientResponse
ClientData → ServerInformation
ServerResponse → ClientError
This strategy represents a precise solution to the problems of control-flow composition and entities overlap. The former
problem is addressed bymatching interaction patterns of one component into patterns of the other and checking the absence
of possible deadlock situations. The latter, the modelling of different abstractions of real world entities, is addressed by a
mapping between entities.
Part of the solution to these problems is achieved through the adoption of the Communication and Synchronisation
Component (CSC) in our strategy. As we have shown in Section 5, CSC is responsible for effectively integrating the
frameworks, as well as coordinating the interaction between the composed frameworks and the environment. The concrete
version of CSC can be automatically generated, provided its parameters are defined for the composition.
Table 1 shows the steps of our strategy to compose frameworks. An overview of the strategy is presented in the rest of
this section through the composition process of CLIENT and SERVER (see Section 2), and the creation of a concrete version of
CSC. The strategy determines how heterogeneous components that encapsulate such frameworks are composed with CSC ,
and how the CSC parameters can be derived from the component contracts.
6.1. Composition strategy
An obvious initial step of the strategy is to identify the possible communication (or composition) points. The composition
goal of our example is to delegate the implementation of the hot spots of CLIENT to SERVER. This interaction is controlled
by the Communication and Synchronisation Component (CSC), which is responsible for, among other things, matching the
corresponding sequences of events and values involved in the communication between the different interfaces (see Fig. 2).
Our example falls into the simpler case where each communicated event from one framework corresponds to one event
of the other. However, our strategy deals with the more general case of many-to-many mappings.
Table 2 captures information for the composition of the processing and validation hot spots of our example. For instance,
when CLIENT (see specification in Section 3) engages on the event validateData, the CSC must synchronise with the event
validateInformation of SERVER. This table shows themapping of occurred events (those events that belong to the hot spot that
require some services) into events enabled by the CSC in the target framework.
Observing the mapping between events in Table 2, we note the need for matching their corresponding values
(parameters) in the communication. For our example, the necessary mapping between parameters of the events in Table 2
is informally described in Table 3.
When composing two frameworks, wemust also guarantee that the events enabled by the CSC are accepted by the target
framework; otherwise the composition would present new deadlock situations. In order to avoid this, the strategy requires
the refinement of frameworks with nondeterministic hot spots by deterministic versions of them. From a practical point of
view, the refinement can be justified by the delegation of the implementation of the hot spot by amore deterministic version
of the framework (see Section 4.2). In our example, the CLIENT framework is the one to be refined. The refined version of
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CLIENT is expressed by CLIENT ′, which presents an external choice operator instead of the internal choice operator on the
validation hot spot, as presented below.
The purpose of the CSC is to define situations inwhich the frameworks can communicate (synchronising on some events)
and those in which they can communicate with the environment, independently. As already explained (see Fig. 6), the part
of CSC responsible for communicating these frameworks is named CSC com. In addition to the set of events in the hot spots,
CSC com is parametrised by information extracted from event sequences in the event and datamapping tables (see Tables 2
and 3). Here, for the sake of brevity, we present only the expanded version of CSC com, introduced below as the process
CSC com(CLIENT ′, SERVER).
CSC com(CLIENT ′, SERVER) = HDSHKCLISERV o9 COMMCLISERV
HDSHKCLISERV = validateData?data→
validateInformation′!MClientData↪→ServerInformation(data)→ SKIP
COMMCLISERV =
validInformation′ → validData→ COMMCLISERV
2 processData?dt → receiveRequest ′!MClientData↪→ServerRequest (dt)→ COMMCLISERV
2 invalidInformation′?msg →
invalidData!MServerResponse↪→ClientError (msg)→ SKIP
2 sendResponse′?resp→ obtainResponse!MServerResponse↪→ClientResponse(resp)→ SKIP
Initially, the process CSC com(CLIENT ′, SERVER) synchronises on the sequence of events (validateData?data) that initiate
the communication between the frameworks (HDSHKCLISERV ). Then it accepts the events of the sequence (COMMCLISERV ), one
by one, until it synchronises on an event that ends the communication. After the occurrence of output events by one of the
frameworks, events of the other are enabled according to Table 2. To facilitate the management of enabled SERVER events,
instead of directly using these events, we use events that internally represent them in the composition; for each event ev,
an event ev′ is created. The purpose of these renamed events is to allow non-interference between the communications
between CLIENT and SERVER and that between SERVER and the environment; further details are explained later on. The
mapping of parameters of the occurred events into parameters of the enabled events are represented by amappingMTA↪→TB ,
where the placeholders TA and TB correspond to types in the domain and in the target specification, respectively, as presented
in Table 3.
To allow SERVER to be free to communicate with the environment when it is not committed with CLIENT (no
communication has been initiated), we define the process CSC sync(SERVER). Here, for the sake of brevity, we present
only the expanded version of CSC sync , introduced below as CSC sync(SERVER); for the complete specification of CSC com
and CSC sync see [27]. Similarly to CSC com, CSC sync(SERVER) first synchronises on the events that initiate every
communication (HDSHKSERV ). Then it communicates intermediate events, and finally those (COMMSERV ) that finalise it.
Observe that CSC sync behaves like CSC com, mapping, for instance, SERVER events into their internal counterparts.
CSC sync(SERVER) = HDSHKSERV o9 COMMSERV
HDSHKSERV = receiveRequest?inf → receiveRequest ′!inf → SKIP
2 validateInformation?inf → validateInformation′!inf → SKIP
COMMSERV = sendResponse?resp→ sendResponse′!resp→ SKIP
2 validInformation→ validInformation′ → SKIP
2 invalidInformation?msg → invalidInformation′!msg → SKIP
The CSC recursively chooses between CSC sync and CSC com. It continuously offers, as illustrated in Fig. 2, the possibility
of synchronisation between CLIENT and SERVER, and between SERVER and the environment. The corresponding CSP process
that represents CSC in our example is presented below:
CSC(CLIENT , SERVER) = (CSC com(CLIENT ′, SERVER)
2
CSC sync(SERVER)) o9 CSC(CLIENT , SERVER)
The general structure of the composition is the parallel combination (‖) of CLIENT , SERVER and CSC(CLIENT , SERVER),
synchronising on events within the hot spots HSCL and within HSSV ; the frameworks have to synchronise on the hot spot
events involved in the communication but may execute all other events independently. Besides that, the communication
hot spots are confined after the composition, using the hiding operator (\).
Definition 22. Let F1 and F2 be two frameworks that require and provide services through the hot spots HSF1 and HSF2 ,
respectively. Then the Communication and Synchronisation Component (CSC) that coordinates their integration, and their
composition using CSC are given by the processes CSC(F1, F2) and C(F1, F2), respectively:
C(F1, F2) = (F1 ‖HSF1 BackEnd(F1, F2)) \ HSF1
where
• BackEnd(F1, F2) = (CSC(F1, F2) ‖HS′F2 F2[R]) \ HS
′
F2
• R is an injective renaming function, R(a) = a if a /∈ HSF2 , R(a) ∈ HS ′F2 if a ∈ HSF2 , and HS ′F2 = {ev′ | ev ∈ HSF2}.
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Definition 22 uses a function R to rename events in HSF2 to events in HS
′
F2
. The objective behind renaming these events
(F2[R]) and then hiding (... \ HS ′F2 ) them is to avoid external interferences. All events within HSF2 are made available by
BackEnd after beingmapped by CSC com and CSC sync. In our example, this allows us to distinguish between an interaction
of SERVERwith the environment from an interaction of SERVERwith CLIENT , since each external interaction uses a different
alphabet, which is also different from the events used by SERVER[R] (renamed process). We replace SERVER by SERVER[R],
where R, according to Definition 22, maps each event ev of the hot spot HSSV into an internal event ev′; for instance,
receiveRequest becomes receiveRequest ′. The expansion of SERVER[R] results in the process SERVER′.
SERVER′COM =
receiveRequest ′?req→ processRequest.req→u resp : ServerResponse • sendResponse′!resp→ SKIP
2
validateInformation′?info→ (
validInformation′ → SKIP
u
(umsg : ServerResponse • invalidInformation′!msg → SKIP))
SERVER′ = SERVER′COM o9 SERVER′
Since the interaction of the environment with SERVER has a synchronisation set HSSV , we preserve this communication
in CSC sync(SERVER). On the other hand, the interaction between CLIENT and SERVER is intermediated by the process
CSC com(CLIENT ′, SERVER), which involves a mapping between events in both frameworks, so that they can communicate
anonymously. Therefore, we can easily instantiate CSC com in such a way that CLIENT events are now mapped into the
renamed events. In practice, CSC offers the same services to the environment and to CLIENT , but using different alphabets.
This allows us to reason independently about each interaction. The framework composition in our example then becomes:
C(CLIENT , SERVER) = (CLIENT ′ ‖HSCL BackEndCLSV ) \ HSCL
where,
• BackEndCLSV = (CSC(CLIENT , SERVER) ‖HS′SV SERVER′) \ HS ′SV• HotSpotSV ′ = {| validateInformation′, invalidInformation′
validInformation′, receiveRequest ′, sendResponse′ |}
With this characterisation of framework composition, we can exemplify preservation of conformance notions in a
modular way.
7. Conformance notions on compositions
In this section we lift the notions for components in Section 4 to characterise conformance notions for component
compositions. These conformancenotions are the guidelines that help us to verifywhether the integration solutionpreserves
certain behaviours of individual components. Even better, we can use these guidelines to design abstract coordinators that
satisfy domain and architectural properties (defined in the component model of Section 4) by construction, independently
from the components assembled to them.
We present three conformance notions for component compositions: Composition Compatibility, Service Conformance and
Substitutability with Sharing of Services. The first two notions capture general properties in compositions, and can be applied
to all integration solution categories presented in Section 5, while the last one is specific for controllers that manage shared
resource. The first notion checks the compatibility of the design entities used in the composition. The secondnotion considers
the composition from outside, allowing one to check the compatibility of services not involved in the composition with the
environment. The last notion captures the resource sharing of services with the composition and with the environment,
verifying its reliability under the sharing of its services. Altogether, these notions allowone to showwhether the composition
preserves the original component services to the environment. This is especially useful in a system evolution scenario, as
we presented in Section 2.
7.1. Composition compatibility
The notion of compatibility on compositions is based on the concept of communication compatibility of components,
presented in Section 4.3. It states that the components to be composed must be compatible in order to avoid deadlock. As a
consequence, if the components to be composed are deadlock-free, then the composition is deadlock-free as well.
In compositions that have a format similar to the one presented in Fig. 7, we need to check the compatibilities of the
component A with BackEnd and of B with FrontEnd. In fact, a simpler way would be just verifying the compatibility of the
glue code (coordinator) with both components. As coordinators are usually abstractly defined at a design level, we need to
restrict their communications to the one used by the protocols of the components under consideration (A and B).
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Fig. 7. Component composition.
Consider a glue code (for instance CSC(F1, F2)) related to the communication through interfaces I1 and I2 of two
components C1 and C2, respectively. We intuitively say that the coordinator safely maps service interactions of C1 into C2, if
service interaction patterns of C1 aremapped into valid interaction patterns provided by C2. This notion is captured formally
by guaranteeing that the control flow and data mapping between the two components C1 and C2 related by the glue code
are compatible with the protocols of both components.
Definition 23. Let C1 and C2 be two components with contracts Ctr1 and Ctr2, I1 and I2 be interfaces, and GLUE com(C1, C2)
be a communication component which maps sequences of events from I1 into I2, such that I1 ∈ Ctr1.interfaces and I2 ∈
Ctr2.interfaces. Then GLUE com(C1, C2) is compatible with C1 and C2 if it is compatible with C1 and compatible with C2.
Note that we do not need to consider the entire components to check whether the mapping of services is consistent.
Only the projections of these components’ behaviours (protocols) in the interfaces involved in the composition are used. To
perform the test characterisation of Definition 23 for component compositions we apply Theorem 21 twice. Each time to
check the compatibility of the coordinator with one of the components it communicates.
According to Theorem 21, the dual protocol of each interface must be refined by the synchronisation of the coordinator
(CSC in our example) with two communication context processes of these interfaces. So, the synchronisation of these
processes is only successfully performed (deadlock-free) if the coordinator safely maps the entire communication between
the two components. In our example, the test would be characterised in the following way:
DUALPCL vF⊥ GLUECTX CS  αHSCL
DUALPSV [R] vF⊥ GLUECTX CS  αHS ′SV
where
• GLUECTX CS = CSC com(CLIENT ′, SERVER) ‖αHSCL∪αHSSV CTXCLSV• CTXCLSV = CTXCL ||| CTXSV• R is an injective renaming function that satisfies R(a) = a if a /∈ HSSV ,
R(a) ∈ HS ′SV if a ∈ HSSV
As expected, we have verified that CSC com safely maps service interaction patterns of CLIENT ′ into SERVER, by checking
that the process resulted from Definition 23 is deadlock-free, using FDR.
7.2. Service conformance
Service conformance is relatively simple to capture. A composition conforms to the services of the original components if
services not directly involved in the composition are preserved. We capture this notion with a refinement expression which
requires that the observed behaviour of the composed components refines the behaviour of the original components, hiding
all interfaces involved in the composition.
Definition 24. Let C1 and C2 be two component with contracts Ctr1 and Ctr2 that require and provide services through the
interfaces I1 and I2, respectively, and P (C1, C2) a composition that integrates these two components via I1 and I2. Then
P (C1, C2) conforms to the services of C1 and C2 if, and only if:
Ctr1.behaviour \ αI1 vist P (C1, C2) \ (αI1 ∪ αI2)
Ctr2.behaviour \ αI2 vist P (C1, C2) \ (αI1 ∪ αI2)
As the events of C1 and C2 not included in the interfaces I1 and I2 do not participate in the framework integration, the
conformance notion of these services can be directly checked with the full behaviour that remains externally observed in
the composition. On the other hand, the conformance related to the services of I1 and I2 have to be checked independently.
This is correlated to the conformance notion in the last section. This is because the coordinator might change the way the
services in these interfaces are observed.
In our example, the elements C1, C2, I1 and I2 in Definition 24 can be replaced by CLIENT ′, SERVER, HSCL and HSSV ,
respectively. The composition is represented by C(CLIENT ′, SERVER).
CLIENT ′ \ αHSCL vist C(CLIENT ′, SERVER) \ (αHSCL ∪ αHSSV )
SERVER \ αHSSV vist C(CLIENT ′, SERVER) \ (αHSCL ∪ αHSSV )
As expected, the refinements in the definition applied to our example hold, as mechanically checked using FDR.
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7.3. Substitutability with sharing of services
The assembly of the server component with the coordinator (BackEnd) (see Fig. 6) must not offer services when the
component is not ready to, neither must refuse any service that is ready to be offered. The notion guarantees that the
interaction of the server with the client component or with the environment does not restrict certain states of the server
component. As we mentioned in Section 3, no other communication can initiate while an interaction pattern is being
performed; in fact, any user that tries to engage in a new communication is blocked until the end of the current one. After
the communication ends, the shared (server) component returns to a state where any user (either the environment or the
client component) can start a communication.
To checkwhether a coordinator (CSC in our example) alwaysmakes the services of the server component available to the
client component and to the environment, we make use of the interaction subtyping relation (Definition 11). This definition
establishes when a new process should be used wherever an original process was expected, without any existing client that
shares its service being able to tell the difference. This definition is especially useful when the new process extends the
services of the original process considering multiple clients, new and existing ones. Abstractly, the idea of the definition
is that all new services, which are offered to other users, only lead to states that are reachable with a sequence of original
services. Moreover, the communication with new clients is isolated from communication with existing clients that explain
them. This definition closelymatches the idea of Liskov andWing’s extensionmaps [39], which requires that any new service
has to be explained in terms of the original services.
Definition 25. Let C1 be a component with contract Ctr1 that requires and provides services through the interface I1,
Manager a component which encloses C1 and manages the sharing of services of I1 between I1 and an interface I2, and
FI1↪→I2 a substitution function. ThenManager safely manages the service sharing of C1 if, and only if:
Ctr1.behaviour vαI2intst Manager
Looking at the process CSC , we observe that the new services are those provided to the client framework, while the
original services are those originally provided to the environment. In our example, the former services are contained in
HSCL, and the latter in HSSV . The mapping from the new services into the original services are, therefore, expressed by the
mapping that parametrises the process CSC com (see Section 6). In what follows we capture the conformance notion with
the process BackEnd (see Definition 22), which synchronises CSC and the server framework.
SERVER vαHSSVintst (BackEndCLSV ‖HSCL∪HSSV CTXCLSV )
where CTXCLSV = CTXCL ||| CTXSV .
In the test characterisation above, the communication context of CSC with CLIENT andwith the environment is expressed
by the synchronisation of the process BackEndCLSV with a process that represents the communication context of CLIENT and
of the environment (CTXCLSV ). In this way, it is possible to show that when the CSC engages in a communication, which
respects the associated protocols, it can provide services to the environment and to CLIENT appropriately. The mappings
performed by CSC com simply replace an interaction pattern with another, which is semantically equivalent, behaving as
the implementation of the substitution function that explains the interaction subtyping. We have checked that the assembly
of the server framework with the glue code (BackEndCLSV ) obeys Definition 25, using FDR.
8. Related work
The Wright [16,3] and rCOS [34,46,47] ADLs present sound component models based on the CSP notation. They
propose distinct solutions for coordination [46,47,3]. In both [16,3] and in [34], concrete connector implementations have a
representation similar to components. However, at the design level, in [3] coordinators are represented as parametrised
CSP processes, connector wrapper templates, and in [46] coordination patterns are represented by global constraints in
the software architecture. An interesting strategy is given in [47] to verify the relation of a coordinator purpose and its
implementation in a programming language. These works are complementary to our approach, since we represent the
external dynamic behaviour of components in a similarway, in terms of CSP processes. However, wemake a clear distinction
of the points of interaction of a component (via interfaces and protocols). Although Wright represents interfaces via ports,
no rule is given for checking protocol compatibility in component compositions; in rCOS, protocols are used to represent
the entire external behaviour of a component, without distinguishing points of interaction. Moreover, none of them
ensures predictability by restricting component types in their component models, neither addresses formal verification
of coordination pattern solutions, as we have presented with the CSC .
There are several verification efforts in the CSP community [34,40] related to updates and reconfigurations of component
architectures. Similar to our work, rCOS [34] differentiates input and output events in order to give a proper definition of
communication compatibility. However, the component communication mechanism model in rCOS is specific for method
invocation [36]. The work reported in [40] presents general substitutability notions for CSP processes, but without checking
the covariance of input events and the contravariance of output events [39]. The substitutability notions presented in [40] are
related to the interaction subtype notionwe propose.We consider these notions often too strong (optimal and safe subtype) or
tooweak (weak subtype) covering practical application.We believe that our substitutability notion for interaction component
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covers a wider range of practical applications, satisfying the same properties as optimal subtype do (when the environment
obeys the assumptions we made in Section 4). Abstractly, optimal subtype only permits cyclic transitions triggered by new
events in a labelled transition system. We allow with the interaction subtype notion the introduction of entire interaction
patterns,without the environment noticing anydifference. This is observed evenwhen the component services are shared by
several other components, sincewe precisely define how the environment communicates with the component (partitioning
the environment and ensuring compatibility in the communication). Our notion also extends safe subtype by considering
substitution functions that explain new sequences of events from existing sequences of events.
Other approaches for composition [10,9] tend only to systematise the integration or reuse of components, lacking either
formality or considering the complex mismatches in the framework behaviour. In Section 6, we present an integration
pattern solution (represented by CSC), which considers the integration of control-flow and state transitions, and is supported
by our conformance notions introduced in Section 7. While the connector matching in [10] always assumes one-to-one
mappings, we address many-to-many relationships between events.
Some other interesting approaches related to our efforts should be mentioned. These works [18,11] provide formal
methodologies and tools to synthesise suitable coordinators for solving behavioural mismatches between heterogeneous
interaction components. In [18], servicemappings are extracted fromMSC specifications of the black-box components in the
system. In [11], service mappings are extracted from protocol definitions with different access rights and their respective
available services. These strategies are similar to our previous work [27], which also considers many-to-many mappings.
Conformance notions are closer to measures for component adaptation [48]. These measures evaluate to which extent an
adaptor satisfies the initially requested integration. Our conformance notions would be interpreted as strict measures about
behaviour preservation in these integrations.
In our work, all verifications and notions analyse partitions of the component (and composition) behaviour in space
(protocols) and time (interaction patterns). This approach combines the advantages of the approaches presented in [12]
and in [37], where physical and temporal partitions are realised, respectively. Protocols are observed as a particular type
in [12], which permits the verification of compatibility and substitutability. However, concerns about the entire component
behaviour are ignored in the definitions of [12]. Interaction patterns are also defined in [37], however without defining
any conformance notion for components or compositions. None of these works defines test characterisations that can
mechanically be performed in verification tools.
9. Conclusion
Although component-based software development providesmechanisms and tools for constructing systems by plugging
components together, the safe construction of these systems is still a research challenge. Conformance notions are required
during several development activities, such as safe composition of third-party components, correct adaptation of library
components and the consistent update of versioned components in component-based architectures. Most of these activities
involve coordination patterns, which are used to integrate components or adapt them. To increase the range of components
they integrate, coordinators are abstractly defined at the design level, usually in a parametrised form. Therefore, the
conformance notions for compositions must include properties of coordinators in order to achieve an effective approach
to verification by construction.
In this work, we have defined a component model for interaction components, with some basic conformance notions
that apply to components in isolation. We have then lifted these notions to characterise three conformance notions for
component compositions: composition compatibility, service conformance, and substitutability with sharing of services.
We show that some of these notions can be applied to coordination patterns from their abstract specification to a more
concrete representation, after components are assembled. To deal with the abstract specifications of coordinators, we use
an important definition of communication context, which is incorporated in testing characterisations of our notions. The
first two conformance notions are general and can be applied to any coordinator pattern. Indeed they cover the main
aspects of patterns classified as Extender or Translator [5], or combinations of them. Composition compatibility is a new
conformance notion that generalises the idea of compatibility of transactions presented in [13]. As a particular case of
behaviour preservation, these patterns together also guarantee preservation of deadlock-freedom in the compositions
that use them. The third conformance notion is exclusive to a subset of control coordinators [5], called resource sharing
managers. Using the three notions, we are able to verify whether a coordinator can safely manage the sharing of services of
a server component (originally designed to provide these services to a unique invoker) without collapsing the component.
Together, they guarantee a consistent extension of the number of heterogeneous clients of the server component, without
the environment noticing any difference. Moreover, they allow the verification of well-formedness of the coordinator that
integrates all these communications.
We defined these notions in terms of the denotational semantics of CSP. In particular, we have adopted the stable failures
model which allows us to avoid undesirable divergences resulting from hiding events. From the denotational definitions,
we have derived some test characterisations that allow us to verify the relevant properties mechanically, using FDR. All
verifications and notions analyse partitions of each component (and composition) behaviour in space (protocols) and time
(interaction patterns), which might dramatically reduce the cost of the verifications in practical systems.
The application of these notions has been illustrated with a systematic strategy for formal composition of
frameworks [27] based on the process algebra CSP. An interesting result of our effort to define conformance notions is
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that this has revealed the need for modifying the definition of composition originally proposed in [27]. The modification
(based on renaming internal events of the server) allowed us to distinguish the origin of different client interactions with
the server framework and permitted the control of possible interferences.
As future work we plan to propose composition rules which ensure, by construction, that coordination patterns preserve
such properties. For example, in the case of the CSC, a desirable proposition would state that our composition strategy
ensures conformance with respect to the original frameworks, checking each conformance notion for compositions defined
in this paper. We also plan to exercise other component patterns of integration, as well as working on mechanical support
for component composition. Finally, we aim to investigate other types of control coordinators, and additional relevant
properties for component composition.
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